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The worm, Trojan horse, bacterium, and virus are destructive programs that attack
information stored in a computer's memory. Virus programs, which propagate by
incorporating copies of themselves into other programs, are a growing menace in the
late-1980s world of unprotected, networked workstations and personal computers.
Limited immunity is offered by memory protection hardware, digitally authenticated
object programs, and antibody programs that kill specific viruses. Additional immun-
ity can be gained from the practice of digital hygiene, primarily the refusal to use
software from untrusted sources. Full immunity requires attention in a social dimen-
sion, the accountability of programmers.
This is a preprint of the column The Science of Computing for
American Scientist 76, No 3 (May-June 1988).
Work reported herein was supported in part by Cooperative Agreement NCC 2-387
between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
and the Universities Space Research Association (USRA).
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Sometime in the middle 1970s, the network of computers at a Silicon Valley
research center was taken over by a program that loaded itself into an idle
workstation, disabled the keyboard, drew random pictures on the screen, and
monitored the network for other idle workstations to invade. The entire network
and all the workstations had to be shut down to restore normal operation.
In early September 1986, a talented intruder broke into a large number of
computer systems in the San Francisco area, including 9 universities, 15 Silicon
Valley companies, 9 ARPANET sites, and 3 government laboratories. The
intruder left behind recompiled login programs to simplify his return. His goal
was apparently to achieve a high score on the number of computers cracked; no
damage was done (1).
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In December 1987, a Christmas message that originated in West Germany
propagated into the Bitnet network of IBM machines in the United States. The
message contained a program that displayed an image of a Christmas treeand
sent copies of itselfto everyone in the mail distributionlistof the user for whom
itwas running. This prolificprogram rapidly clogged the network with a
geometrically growing number of copies of itself.Finallythe network had to be
shut down untilallcopiescould be located and expurgated.
For two months in the fallof 1987, a program quietlyincorporated copiesof
itselfinto programs on personal computers at the Hebrew University. Itwas
discovered and dismantled by a student, Yuval Rakavy, who noticed that certain
libraryprograms were growing longer for no apparent reason. He isolatedthe
errant code and discovered that ifexecuted on certain Fridays the thirteenth the
computer running it would slow down by 80%, and on Friday 13 May 1988, it
would erase all files. That date was the fortieth anniversary of the last day
Palestine was recognized as a separate political entity. Rakavy designed another
program that detected and erased all copies of the errant program it could find.
Even so, he could not be completely sure he had eradicated it.
These four incidents illustrate the major types of programs that attack
other programs in a computer's memory. The first type is a worm, a program
that invades a workstation and disables it. The second is a Trojan horse, a pro-
gram that performs some apparently useful function, such as login, while con-
taining hidden code that performs an unwanted, usually malicious function.
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This name isinspired by the legendary wooden horse builtby the Greek army,
ostensiblyas an offeringto Athena, which in the dark of night disgorged itsbel-
lyfulof murderous soldiersinto the sleepingstreetsof Troy. The third type isa
bacterium, a program that replicatesitselfand feeds offthe host system by
preempting processor and memory capacity. The fourth isa virus,a program
that incorporates copiesof itselfinto the machine codes of other programs and,
when those programs are invoked, wreaks havoc in the manner of a Trojan
horse.
I can cite numerous other incidents in which information stored in comput-
ers has been attacked by hostile programs. An eastern medical center lost nearly
40% of its records to a malicious program in its system. Students at Lehigh
University lost homework and other data when a virus erased diskettes inserted
into campus personal computers. Some programs available publicly from elec-
tronic bulletin boards have destroyed information on the disks of computers into
which they were read. A recent New York Times article (2) describes many
examples and documents the rising concern among computer network managers,
software dealers, and personal computer users about these forms of electronic
vandalism. In an effort to alert concerned computer scientists to the onslaught,
the Association for Computing Machinery sponsors the Computer Risks Forum,
an electronic newsletter moderated by Peter G. Neumann of SRI International,
which regularly posts notices and analyses of such dangers.
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The recent rash of viral attacks has drawn everyone's attention to the more
general problem of computer security, a subject of great complexity which has
fascinated researchers since the early 1960s (3). The possibility of pernicious
programs propagating through a file system has been known for at least twenty-
five years. In his May 1985 Computer Recreations column in Scientific Ameri-
can, Kee Dewdney documented a whole menagerie of beastly threats to informa-
tion stored in computer memories, especially those of personal computers (J),
where an infected diskette can transmit a virus to the main memory of the com-
puter, and thence to any other diskette (or to hard disk). Ken Thompson, a
principal designer of UNIX TM, and Ian Witten have documented some of the
more subtle threats to computers that have come to light in the 1980s (5,6).
It is important to keep in mind that worms, Trojan horses, bacteria, and
viruses are all programs designed by human beings. Although a discussion of
these menaces brings up many intriguing technical issues, we should not forget
that at the root of the problem are programmers performing disruptive acts
under the cloak of anonymity conveniently provided by many computer systems.
I will focus on viruses, the most pernicious of the attacks against informa-
tion in computers. A virus is a code segment that has been incorporated into
the body of another program, "infecting" it. When the virus code is executed, it
locates a few other uninfected programs and infects them; in due course, the
number of infected programs can grow quite large. Viruses can spread with
remarkable speed: in experimental work performed in 1983 and 1984, Fred
TR-88.10 (21 Mar 1988) Computer Viruses/5
Cohen of the University of Cincinnati demonstrated that a simple virus program
can propagate to nearly every part of a normally operating computer system
within a matter of hours. Most viruses contain a marker that allows them to
recognize copies of themselves; this avoids discovery, because otherwise some
programs would get progressively longer under multiple infections. The destruc-
tive acts themselves come later: any copy of the virus that runs after some
appointed date will perform such an unwanted function.
A Trojan horse program is the most common means of introducing a virus
into a system. It is possible to rig a compiler with an invisible Trojan horse that
implants another Trojan horse into any selected program during compilation.
A virus that takes the form of statements inserted into the high-level
language version of a program -- that is, into the source file -- can possibly be
detected by an expert who reads the program, but finding such a program in a
large system can be extremely difficult. Many viruses are designed to evade
detection completely by attaching themselves to object files, the machine coded
images of high-level program sources that are produced by compilation. These
viruses cannot be detected from a reading source programs.
The first serious discussions of Trojan horses took place in the 1960s. Vari-
ous hardware features were developed to reduce the chances of attack (3), includ-
ing virtual memory, which restricts a program's to a limited region of memory,
its "address space" (7). All these features arebased on the principle of least
privilege, which reduces the set of accessible objects to the minimum a program
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needs in order to perform its function. Because a suspect program can be run in
a strictly confined mode, any Trojan horse it contains will be unable to perform
much damage.
How effective is virtual memdry against viruses? Memory protection
hardware can significantly reduce the risk, but a virus can still propagate to legi-
timately accessible programs, including portions of the operating system. The
rate of propagation may be slowed by virtual memory, but propagation is not
stopped. Most PCs are especially vulnerable because they have no memory pro-
tection hardware at all; an executing program has free access to-_nything in
memory or on disk. A network of PCs is even more vulnerable, because any PC
can propagate an infected copy of a program to any other PC, no questions
asked.
What can be done to protect against viruses in a computer or workstation
without memory protection hardware or controls on access to files? One com-
mon proposal is to retrofit the operating system with a write query check that
asks the user for permission to allow the running program to modify a file. This
gives the user an opportunity to determine that the program is attempting to
gain acces to unauthorized files. It is, unfortunately, hardly workable even for
experienced programmers because of the difficulty of discovering which files a
running program must legitimately modify. A design that suppresses write
queries for files named in an authorization list associated with a program can be
subverted by a virus that adds the name of the unauthorized file to the list
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before attacking it.
A more powerful immunization scheme is based on digital signatures of
object files. When a program is installed in a system, an authenticator is created
by producing a checksum that depends on all the bits of a file, which is then
signed with the secret key of the person who stored the file (8). The authentica-
tor can be unlocked by applying the public key of that person. A user can
confirm that a file is an exact copy of what was stored by computing its check-
sum and comparing that with the unlocked authenticator. A program infected
by a virus would fail this test. Without access to the secret key, the designer of
the virus could not produce a valid authenticator for the infected program. This
scheme also works for programs obtained from trusted sources over a network:
each program comes with an authenticator sealed by the trusted producer.
One way to implement this scheme is to equip the operating system with a
background process that randomly checks files against their authenticators. If a
virus has entered the system, this process will eventually discover an infected file
and raise the alarm. Another way to implement this scheme is to "innoculate"
an object program by placing an authentication subroutine at its entry point.
This implementation is slow, however, and can be defeated by a virus that
invades entry points: by the time the authenticator gets control, the virus will
already have acted.
The authenticator scheme relies on the protection of the secret key, which
cannot be complete unless the key is kept outside the system. It also rests on the
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integrity of the system itself: for example, a sophisticated attack against the pro-
gram that reports whether a file has been infected could disable the scheme.
A program called an antibody can offer limited remedies should a virus
penetrate a system. Such a program examines an object file to determine
whether a known virus has been incorporated. It may also remove the virus
from the infected program. This limited form of protection can be very effective
against known viruses, but it cannot identify new ones.
As we have seen, each of the major technical mechanisms - memory protec-
tion hardware, dlgital-signature authenticators, and antibodies - offers limited
protection against viruses (and Trojan horses). Can the operating procedures
followed by those who use a computer system lower the risk further?
Yes! An additional measure of protection can be obtained by care in the
way one uses a computer. Analogies with food and drug safety are helpful. Just
as one would not consider purchasing food or capsules in unsealed containers or
from untrusted sources, one can refuse to use any unsealed software or software
from untrusted sources. Never insert a diskette that has no manufacturer's seal
into your PC. Never use a program borrowed from someone who does not prac-
tice digital hygiene to your own standards. Beware of software obtained from
public bulletin boards. Purchase programs that check other programs for known
viruses. Be wary of public domain software (including virus eradicators!). Moni-
tor the last-modified dates of programs and files. Don't execute programs sent
in electronic mail -- even your friends may have inadvertently forwarded a virus.
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Don't let employees bring software from home.
The problem of viruses is difficult, both technically and operationally, and
no solution oriented entirely along technical or operational lines can be complete.
There is a third, social dimension to the problem: we don't know how to hold
people fully accountable for the actions of their programs in a networked system
of computers. A complete solution must involve all three dimensions.
Computer scientists are divided over whether it serves the field to publish
accounts of viral attacks in full technical detail. (This article, being superficial,
does not count.) Some hold that revelations of technical detail -- as in Dewdney
(4) or Witten (6) - are reprehensible because they give the few would-be perpe-
trators a blueprint for actions that can make life exceedingly difficult for the
many innocent users, and because there are few successful defenses against the
attacks. Others hold that the main hope for a long term solution is to mobilize
the "good guys" by setting forth the problems in detail; the short term risk,
according to this view, is offset by the long-term gain. Most computer scientists
favor this way of mobilizing forces to oppose computer sabotage.
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Box 1: How a Virus Works
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A program infected with a virus (shaded area) and loaded and executing in the mat n
memory of a computer can infect another executable (object) program in the computer's disk
storage system by secretly requesting the computer's operating system to append e copy of
the virus code to the object program usually at the start. The infection makes the object
program slightly longer.
When the newly infected program is itself loaded into memory and invoked, the virus in it
takes control and performs hidden functions, such as i nfecti ng yet other object programs.
The vi rus may also perform destructive functions before trensferri ng control to the original
entry point. The virus codecontains a marker so that e virus won't attempt to infect a
program al ready infected by its own kind: multi ple infections will cause an object file to
grow ever larger, leading to easy detection.
The same principle works in personal computers (PCs), where floppy disks play the role
of object files in the description above. In this case, the virus usually attacks the copy of the
operating system contai ned on the floppy disk so that the virus is automaticelly invoked
whenever the disk's opereti ng system is started. 5i nce the operali ng system then resides in
the PC's main memory, it can infect any diskettes inserted into the PC.
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Box 2: A Trojan Horse
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A Trojan Horse is a useful program contai ni ng hidden code that performs an unwanted,
mischevlous function. It might copy the invoker's private files into an area of memory
belongi ng to the Trojan Horse's designer, thereby ci rcumventi ng the owner's file protection. It
might obtain access to a s ubs yale m nor mail y i naccessi ble to t he designe r. A Troj an Horse t hat
destroys or erases files is also called a logic bomb.
It is sometimes suggested that Trojan Horses can be detected by scanning the borrowed
program's source file for statements that perform operations outside the program's
specifications. Ken Thompson, one of the pri nci pal designers of UNIX TM, has potnted out that this
approach is fundamental1 g incomplete. He demonstrated how to rig a compiler _o introduce a
Trojan Horse into the object file orang other selected program, for example the login program
(5). Whenever the logi n program is recompiled, the rigged compiler al,,'ags inserts a segment
of code t hat allows 1ogin w henave r a speciel pessword ( known onl g to t he Troj an Horse's
designer) is given. The login program's Trojan Horse cannot be detected by reading the login
program's source file.
Nov, it might seem that a careful reading of the rigged compiler's source file would reveal
the Trojan Horse that inserts the loginTrojan Horse. But this is not so. The rigged compiler is
itself" an object code, and can thereby contei n its own Trojan Horse without a record in the
compiler's source file. Thompson demonstrated a scheme to rig a compiler in this way (5,6).
